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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH S. HILTSLEY, personally, 
and RUTHS. HILTSLEY, Administra-
trix of the Estate of MILTON J. 
HILTSLEY aka M.J. HILTSLEY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HALLALENE M. RYDER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19145 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case filed by plaintiff on her own behalf and 
as the administratrix of her husband's estate, against the 
defendant, (1) asserting rights as to certain monies disposed of 
by decedent prior to his death which were taken from a bank 
account(Ex.5P) held, at the time of closing the account,in the 
joint names of the decedent, the plaintiff and the defendant; 
and (2) to award one savings account(Ex. 7P) and two savings 
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certificates(Ex.3P and 4P) to plaintiff even though held in 
joint naoes of decedent and defendant. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury and the judgment was 
rendered in several parts. The Court rendered judgment in favo: 
of the plaintiff in her own right against defendant for the sum 
of $4,924.66 holding that such sum represented plaintiff's sharE 
as a tenant in common in the bank account(Ex.SP) closed by 
decedent prior to his death. (R.97-98) The Court further orderec 
defendant to pay the personal representative of Etta \Jood (a 
non-party) the sum of $10,000.00 representing the latter's 
contribution to such The Court furthe: 
ordered defendant to pay to the personal representative of the 
estate of Etta Wood, all oonies on deposit in a money market 
certificate at American Savings and Loan Association(Ex.4P), anc 
all monies on deposit in a money market certificate at 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
The court further held that 
defendant was entitled to the monies held in the American 
Savings and Loan Association savings passbook(Ex.7P) (R.93,23). 
RELIEF SOUGHT OU APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks an order reversing the Judg-
ment and orders found in the Judgoent c'l. the Court as a oatter 
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of law, cind awarding defendant the amounts held in the money 
market certificates(Ex.3P and 4P). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is the surviving wife of Milton J. Hiltsley 
(hereinafter decedent) who died on August 26, 1981. Plaintiff 
was appointed the personal representative of decedent's estate 
on October 7, 1981. Plaintiff brought this action in her 
representative capacity as personal representative, and on her 
own behalf making claim against the defendant of fraud, 
alienation of affections , undue influence, and for diversion by 
defendant of assets in which plaintiff had an interest as the 
wife of deceased or his personal representative. (R.3-5). 
Decedent was a Pastor of the Baptist faith, ministering 
in Salt Lake City, Utah for 20 years prior to his death, first 
at the Bethel Baptist Church for three years and then the First 
Baptist Church of Holladay for the last seventeen years (R.149). 
The decedent, the plaintiff and the defendant had a 
close, continuous and friendly relationship as friends, 
neighbors and church associates. For the past 20 years, 
defendant had been an active member of the churches over which 
decedent ministered, and served as clerk or secretary of the 
First Baptist Church of Holladay, and was one of its 
incorporators. (R. 87, Findings U-4). 
Plaintiff and decedent were neighbors of the defendant, 
they visited and ate in each others homes together frequently, 
traveled together, shared a garden and worked together to keep 
the church going. (R.87-88, Findings 
Defendant made donations to deceased directly and 
deceased paid various expenses for defendant over the years. 
(R.88, Findings t6) Defendant did ironing for decedent, cut 
hair and made gifts to the decedent and plaintiff (R.432-434). 
The parties were such close friends that they even slev 
in the same room together while traveling. (R.195-196). 
At the time of decedent's death, the passbook 
account(Ex. 7P), and the two money oarket certificates (Ex. 3P ar .. 
4P) were held in the joint names of M.J. Hiltsley (decedent) R 
Hallalene (or H.M.) Ryder (defendant). 
The plaintiff had made no deposit to or withdrawal fro[, 
these certificates and passbook account, and had n0 knowledge u: 
them until shortly after decedent's death when she found them i 
the home, in a hollowed-out place under the fireplace in the 
study. (R.57-61, and 185-186). 
LEGAL ARGUME!lT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF ETTA WOOD, A NON-PARTY. 
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The judgQent of the trial court is that neither plain-
tiff nor defendant is entitled to the monies represented or 
evidenced by the money market certificates in American Savings 
and Loan Association #ll-013277-9(Ex.4P) and Prudential Federal 
Savings and Loan Association #003-300,1723-l(Ex.3P) and that the 
monies in those two accounts, plus an additional $10,000.00 used 
by the decedent as his contribution to the down payment on the 
condominium purchased by the defendant and the decedent in their 
joint names with rights of survivorship, should be awarded and 
paid over to Etta Wood(R.98-99). (Etta Wood was the sister of 
the decedent who predeceased him). Said portions of the 
Judgment order the defendant to pay sums to Etta Woods' personal 
representative. Etta Wood was not, nor was her personal 
representative, a party to the action. No summons or conplaint 
was ever served upon her or her personal representative, nor 
were any pleadings or claims at trial made by either litigant 
for or against Etta Wood or her estate. 
A. Judgment May Not be Rendered in Favor of a Non-Party 
to the Litigation. 
It is an eleoentary common law principle that a judgment 
may not be rendered in favor of one not a party to the action or 
proceeding. See 49 C.J.S. Judgments, §28, pp. 68-71; 46 Am Jur 
2d, Judgments, §86; Houser v. Smith, et al, 19 U. 150, 56 
P.683(1889); In re Pingrees Estate, 82 U. 437, 25 P. 2d 937, 90 
ALR. 96 (1933); Tanner v. Provo Reserver Co., 99 U. 158, 103 P. 
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2d 134 (1940); McDonnell v. Southern Pacific Company, et al., ' 
Ariz. 10, 281 P. 2d 792 (1955); Fazzi v. Peters, 440 P. 2d 242, 
68 Cal. Reptr. 170, 68 C. 2d 590 (1968); Ex-parte Wren, 308 P. 
2d 329, 48 C. 2d 159; Hurt v. Jones, 304 P. 2d 786, 147 C.A. 2d 
164 (1957); In re Ferrero's Estate, 298 P. 2d 604, 142 C.A. 2d 
473 (1956); Hutchinson v. California Trust Co. 111 P. 2d 401, 4: 
C.A. 2d 571 (1941); Greco v. Foster, 268 P. 2d 215, (Okla 1954); 
Anita Ditch Co. vs. Turner, 389 P. 2d 1018 (Wyo 1964); Ridley 1. 
Vander Boez!!, 511 P. 2d 273, 95 Ida 456 (1973); Windsor v. 
Powell, 497 P. 2d 292, 209 Kan. 292 (1972);Williams v. City of 
Valdez, 603 P, 2d 483, appeal after removed 624 P. 2d 820 
(1979); and United States 'l. Union P.R. Co., 98 US 569, 24 L Ee' 
143. 
The law in Utah is in agreement with this principle. A' 
early as 1889 in the case of Houser v. Smith, supra, our 
Court considered the question of whether the trial court had 
right to dispose of and adjudicate property rights of persons 
who were not parties to the case but strangers to the record. 
In that case, plaintiff sought to quiet title and recover 
possession of land pursuant to a decree entered in an earlier, 
but different action, wherein defendants Morgan and Carlston 
were not parties. 
The trial court held that title was still in t!organ, 
that the earlier decree declaring the Smith to Morgan deed and 
the Morgan to Carlston mortgage void, was itself of no force o: 
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effect because Morgan and Carlston were not parties to the suit 
where such rights were litigated. In affirming, the Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
The defendants Horgan and Carlston were 
strangers to the proceeding under which the decree 
was obtained. The property was wrongfully and 
illegally decreed to belong to another party, 
without the owners being made parties to the action, 
or having any opportunity to be heard in Court to 
defend the title thereto. 
* * * 
On the face of the record as shown, the decree 
in the case of Soith against Smith, insofar as it 
declares said deed and mortgage void, is wholly and 
absolutely void, and was rendered without jurisdiction 
over the persons or property of said Morgan and 
Carlston. It is not a question of collateral attack 
upon the judgment. The record presents a case where 
the judgment is shown to be absolutely void, and ren-
dered against persons who were not before the court, 
and over whom the court had no jurisdiction. Courts 
have no ri ht to dis ose of and ad'udicate u 
property ts o persons who are not parties to the 
case, and w o are total strangers to the record. Van 
Fleet, Coll. attach, §16,494; Mosby v. Gisborn, 54 
Pac. 121, 17 (Emphasis added) 
The same principal was again applied in the case of 
Tanner v. Provo Reservor Co., supra, wherein the court stated at 
page 135 of the opinion, 
The Power Company is not a party to this suit 
but it was a party to No. 2888 Civil and is bound 
by that Decree .... A decree in this suit cannot 
alter the rights and duties of the Power Company or 
bind it in any way whatever. (Emphasis added). 
In the case of McDonnell v. Southern Pacific Company, 
supra, the trial court, in an action to quiet title to real 
property, rendered judgment finding a non-party to be the owner 
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in fee simple. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona 
reversed, stating: 
A court has no jurisdiction to render a judgment 
in favor of one not a party to the suit. 30 Am Jur, 
Judgments §35; 49 C.J.S., Judgments §28; Bachman v. 
Sepulveda, 39 Cal. 688; Dunlap v. Southerlin, 63 Tex. 
38; Maurer v. International Re Insurance Cor . , 
Del., 5 A. 7. Parties cannot e roug t into 
court and a valid judgment rendered for or against 
them by merely including them in the judgment. As 
was well said in Dunlap v. Southerlin, supra; 
Courts have no more power, until their 
action is called into exercise bv some kind 
of pleading to render a judgment' in favor of 
any person than they have to render judgment 
against a person until he has been brought 
within the jurisdiction of the court in some 
method recognized by law as sufficient; ... 
In the case of Hutchinson v. California Trust Company, 
supra, the plaintiff sued the special administrator of his 
deceased wife's estate to have determined the ownership of a 
bank account. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the mone· 
in the account was conununity property, not the deceased's 
separate property. 
The trial court determined that the bank account was a 
gift to the deceased wife, therefore not community property, ar 
ordered the account to be distributed equally between the sons 
of the plaintiff and deceased wife according to an agreement 
executed prior to probate. 
In refersing the holding of the trial court, the 
appellate court stated, at page 403: 
An additional reason for holding that the court erred 
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In addition to the above, a review of Rule 19(b) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure shows the error of the trial court in 
this matter. 
(b) Effect of failure to join. When persons 
who are not indispensable, but who ought to be parties 
if complete relief is to be accorded between those 
already parties, have not been made parties and are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to service 
of process, the court shall order them summoned to 
appear in the action. The court in its discretion 
may proceed in the action without making such persons 
parties, if its jurisdiction over them can be 
acquired only by their consent or voluntary appearance; 
but the judgment rendered therein does not affect 
the rights or liabilities of absent persons. (Emphasis 
added) 
B. Trial Courts' Findings that Decedent Held Thirty 
Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) in Trust for Etta 
Wood Based upon Insufficient Evidence and Manifest 
Speculation. 
The trial court's judgment, ordering defendant-appellant 
to pay the personal representative of Etta Wood the sum of 
$10,000.00 representing funds withdrawn from a passbook 
account(ex.SP) and used by the decedent in the down payment on 
the purchase of the condominium of the defendant, and further 
ordering the defendant-appellant to pay over to the personal 
representative of the estate of Etta Wood all sums on deposit in 
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certificate 1111-013277-9 at Ar:lerican Savings and Loan(Ex. 4P) ar. 
all sums in certificate #003-300723-6 at Prudential Federal 
Savings and Loan(Ex.3P) was based upon the finding of the trial 
court set forth in paragraph 24 of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law(R.94) as follows: 
It seems clear the decedent must be considered 
as having received the $30,000.00 from Etta Wood in 
trust for her and this money was not his money to 
invest as he did and did not become his upon her 
death to give away or use for his own purposes. 
The sum total of all the evidence submitted to the couc· 
on this matter is represented by certain statements made by the 
defendant on cross-examination and certain entries contained in 
the ledger, Exhibit 10-P. 
After testifying that the decedent had inherited 
$21,000.00 from his brother (R.210-211), the following 
and answers appear in the transcript (R. 212) beginning on line 2 
Q. Did Mr. Hiltsley also have a sister who lived 
in New Mexico? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did that sister die prior to the time of 
your husband's death? 
A. About '80. 
Q. And did she leave to Mr. Hiltsley a sum of 
money? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how much money was that? 
A. Well, I can't--here again, I can't say just 
what because my husband never told C1e very much. But 
as far as I can figure out, Etta, that is oy sister-in 
law, when she came up to live with us, she was in and 
out of the hospital quite a number of tiC1es 'cause she 
had lung cancer and this time she was in the hospital 
and I think my husband said that there was about four 
or five thousands in debt. Now, whether that came out 
of the $20,000.00 that he inherited I don't know. 
(Emphasis added) 
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The only other evidence on the matter is Exhibit P-10 
where en page 253 the following notations are shown: 
10/5/79 received money from Etta's account 
transferred to Salt Lake from Albuquerque, N.M.--
$30,000.00 plus 314--a shortage of $8.+-
The AH Savings will check the shortage for 
me--placed $10,000.00 in savings passbook, 
placed $10,000.00 in money market at AM 
Savings, 
$10,000.00 in money market @ PFS. 
As stated above neither party introduced the above 
testimony or exhibit for the purposes of showing how decedent 
acquired the funds or what his obligations were regarding those 
funds, or what ownership he had in the funds. However, from 
such scanty evidence, the court made the findings represented in 
paragraph 24 of the Findings of Fact, Findings) 
referred to above. 
Admittedly, presumptions form an important part of the 
law of evidence generally. However, defendant-appellant submits 
that to presume or infer from such evidence as there is in this 
case, as the trial court did, that (1) the decedent held $30,000 
in trust for Etta Wood (R.89-92, Findings and (2) the 
$30,000.00 is traceable into the certificates and accounts in 
question, is nothing more than manifest conjecture and 
speculation. 
A reading of the trial court's findings relative to 
these matters only points out the uncertainty of the entire 
decision. 
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Referring to Exhibit 4P, the money market certificate 
American Savings, the trial court said: 
Althou h no evidence at the trial was aiven tracin 
t e istory o t e account, t e account, on Fe ruary 
14, 1980 was shown as $12,000.00. From Exhibit 10-P 
it would appear that $10,000.00 from Etta Wood's 
account received by decedent on October 5, 1979 was 
placed in this American Savings account, and the 
only inference that can be drawn is that the initial 
$10,000.00 deposit came from Etta's transferred funds. 
(R.92, Findings 1118). (Emphasis added) 
In paragraph 18 of the trial court's Findings, (R.92) 
the court attempts to trace Exhibit 3P back to Etta Wood's func, 
but, from the evidence can only trace it back to the opening o: 
account No. 715-100-837-3 opened February 22, 198G and closed 
August 28, 1980 by withdrawal of $16,161.29. Yet from the entr 
on page 253 Exhibit lOP, upon which the courc bases its 
findings, the deposit of $10,000.00 appears to have been made 
"10/5/79". There was no tracing of the account back to 10/5/79 
No evidence was subnitted to show how $10,000.00 deposited on 
10/5/79 had grown to $16,161.29 within a few months. The tria'. 
court, however, finds in paragraph 19 of the Findings (R.92) 
that "Court finds that a substantial portion, if not all, of 
Account No. 715-101422-2 (Ex.3P) is the Etta Wood original 
$10,000.00 deposit and earnings thereon held as trustee for Et· 
Wood." 
The court has presumed from the entry on page 253 of 
Exhibit lOP, that the decedent held Etta's monies for her in 
trust. It then presumes, on the basis of even less certain 
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evidence, that such monies were deposited into the accounts or 
certificates before the court. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the basic principle 
that a presumption cannot be based upon a presumption as early 
as 1916 in Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Ashton-Whyte-Skillicorn Co., 
49 Utah 82, 162 Pac. 83 (1916), wherein this Court held: 
As the record now stands, however, the presumption of 
defendant's negligence must be based upon another 
presumption, namely that the cars were in the actual 
control and management of the defendant when they 
escaped. This would result in basing one presumption 
upon another which would be violation of an elementary 
rule of evidence Id. at 85. 
The same rule is well stated in Splinter v. City of Nampa, 74 
Idaho 1, 10, 256 P. 2d 215, 220 (1953). 
Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish 
negligence and proximate cause. Facts, which are 
essential to a liability for negligence, may be inferred 
upon circumstances which are established by evidence. 
But, where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, 
the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves 
be left to presumption or inference. (Citation.) This 
court has held that inference cannot be based upon 
inference, nor presumption on presumption. (Citations.) 
The underlying principle applicable here is that 
a verdict cannot rest on conjecture; that where a party 
seeks to establish a liability by circumstantial 
evidence, he must establish circumstances of such 
nature and so related to each other that his theory 
of liability is the more reasonable conclusion to be 
drawn therefrom, and that where the proven facts are 
e uall consistent with the absence, as with the 
existence, o neg igence on t e part o e en ant, 
the plaintiff has not carried the burden of proof 
and cannot recover. (Citations.) (Emphasis added.) 
A presumption or inference of fact must not be drawn 
from premises which are uncertain, but must be founded on facts 
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established by direct evidence. In this respect, this Court 
held in Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 497 P. 2d 
28 (1972) that: 
(A) finding of causation cannot be predicated on mere 
speculation or conjecture, and the matter must be 
withdrawn from the jury's consideration, unless there 
is evidence from which the inference may reasonably be 
drawn that the injury suffered was caused by the 
negligent act of the defendant. (Milligan v. 
Furniture Co., 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335 P. 2d 61 
0959).) 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, ON ALL ISSUES. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in its Application of the Lai·. 
as to Ownership of Joint Account During Lifetime. 
The trial court found that the American Savings and Loa 
Association savings account #1-048466 (Ex. 5-P) which had been 
closed by decedent twenty-two (22) months before his death, was 
an account held by tenants in common. Further the trial court 
determined that 
.... the proceeds should be divided equitably between 
the plaintiff and defendant as follows: 
$10,000.00 to be held for the account of Etta Wood and 
subject to probate of her estate; $16,150.68 allocated 
to defendant as her contribution to the account; 
$9,849.32 divided between the other tenants in common, 
Ruth Hiltsley and deceased (sic defendant) each having 
an interest of $4,924.66. The balance of the account 
$1,481.21, the deceased distributed in the manner 
determined by him to be equitable. (R.90, Findings 
H6(l)(d)). 
The trial court apparently "bought" the argument of 
plaintiff that once a tenant in common account was establish8c 
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the interest of one co-tenant could not be destroyed by the 
action of the other co-tenant. Said savings account was closed 
by decedent on October 29, 1979, twenty-two months prior to his 
death, by a withdrawal of the monies therein and used as part of 
the down payment on the condominium purchased by the defendant 
and decedent in their joint names. (R.90, Findings ,16(a)). 
It is important to note, however, that although the 
trial court made a finding that the account was a "tenancy in 
common" account, and awarded plaintiff $4,924.66 (R.97) as her 
share of the account, yet the court allowed the decedent to 
distribute $1,481.21 of the account "in the manner determined by 
him to equitable". (R. 91, Findings U6(d). 
The law relative to ownership of a joint account during 
the lifetime of the parties thereto is set forth in §75-6-103 
(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which states: 
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime 
of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the 
net contributions by each to the sums on deposit, 
unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a 
different intent. 
§75-6-101 (6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
defines net contribution as follows: 
"Net contribution" of a party to a joint 
account as of any given time is the sum of all 
deposits to it made by or for him, less all 
withdrawals made by or for him which have not 
been paid to or applied to the use of any other 
party, plus a prorata share of any interest or 
dividends included in the current balance. The 
term includes, in addition, any proceeds of 
deposit, life insurance added to the account by 
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reason of the death of the party whose net contri-
bution is in question. 
As regards the claim of the plaintiff that she had an 
ownership interest in the account by virtue of the account beir.; 
a "tenancy in common" account, which interest could not be 
alienated by her husband during his lifetime, appellant refers 
this court to the last two sentences of the Editorial Board 
Comment following §75-6-103, wherein it is stated: 
The theory of these sections is that the 
basic relationship of the parties is that of 
individual ownership of values attributable to 
their respective deposits and withdrawals; the 
right of survivorship which attaches unless 
negated by the form of the account really is a 
right to the values theretofore owned by another 
which the survivor receives for the first time 
at the death of the owner. That is to say, the 
account operates as a valid disposition at 
death rather than as a present joint tenant. 
It follows, therefore, that the decedent had the abso-
lute right to withdraw the monies from said account for purpose' 
satisfactory to him and the plaintiff had no interest in those 
monies unless and until the decedent died leaving the account i'. 
her joint name. 
B. Plaintiff-Respondent Offered No Evidence of The 
Intent of The Decedent-Depositor in Creating Joint 
Accounts. 
The holdings of Utah cases such as McCullough v. 
Wasserback, 30 U. 2d 398, 518 P. 2d 691 (1974) Pagano v. WalkeL 
539 P. 2d 452 (U. 1975) and Spader v. Newbold, 29 U. 2d 453, 5; 
P. 2d 153 (1973) established rules regarding the ownership of 
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joint bank accounts upon the death of the depositor. To the 
extent that those rules relate to actions against the estate of 
the decedent, they have now been codified in §75-6-104 (1) Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as aoended where it provides as follows: 
Sums remaining on deposit at the death of 
a party to a joint account belong to the surviving 
party or parties as against the estate of the 
decedent unless there is clear and convincing 
evidence of a different intention at the time 
the account is created. 
The plaintiff alleged no claim in her pleadings and 
offered no evidence at trial of a different on the 
part of the deceased than to have the surviving joint tenant 
have the funds in the certificates. In fact, the Will of the 
decedent executed August 9, 1978 (Ex.6P) offered by plaintiff 
states: 
Thirdly. I direct all savings certificates, 
savings accounts and checking accounts held jointly by 
myself and another, shall become the sole property 
of such surviving co-signer. 
C. Plaintiff-Respondent's Allegations of Fraud, 
Alienation of Affections and Undue Influence are 
Not Supported by the Evidence. 
The plaintiff rested her case on the theory that she was 
entitled to the certificates in issue because of the allegations 
of fraud, alienation of affections and undue influence made by 
her. 
The trial court correctly made findings of fact contrary 
to such allegations: 
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9. Other than the Will preparation and the 
manner in which deceased handled his findings, 
plaintiff did not produce evidence of alienation 
of her husband's affections for her. (R.88) 
10. Court is unable to determine why the deceasec 
favored defendant over plaintiff on the financial 
transactions described herein ... (R.88) 
25. As to the claims for relief made by the 
plaintiff, the evidence does not establish the 
essential elements of fraud in this case. Nor 
does the Court find evidence of willful and 
malicious conduct on the part of defendant such 
as would support the claim for punitive damages. (R.941 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is submitted that the Cour· 
had no power to render judgment in favor of a non-party to th€ 
litigation and that such judgment is null and void; that in an 
event, the evidence to support a finding of the Court that the 
decedent held monies in trust for said non-party is based upon 
insufficient and speculative evidence; that the plaintiff has 
failed to bear her burden of proving a different intent on the 
part of decedent in establishing the accounts than that the 
surviving tenant should own the certificates; that plaintiff h; 
failed to prove any other ground for awarding the accounts to 
her as against the defendant. Based upon the foregoing, the 
Judgment of the trial court should be reversed and defendant 
awarded the funds in the certificates at American Savings and 
Loan Association account #ll-613277-9(Ex.4P) and Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Association account 
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#715-101,422-2(Ex.3P), as the sole surviving joint tenant to 
said certificates, and the judgment in favor of plaintiff in the 
amount of $4,924.26 should be reversed as well as the Order 
requiring the to pay amounts to the personal 
representative of Etta Wood. 
Dated September 2, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE 
500 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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